Individuals and teams participate in a hidden-action trust game with pre-play communication. The present paper explores whether this positive effect of non-binding communication extends to two-person teams with imperfectly observable actions. This is important since if decision making by individuals and teams differs substantially, false inferences may be drawn from experiments using individuals as decision makers. Second, employing two person teams as decision makers allows for recording within-team conversations which provides insight into decision makers' motivation for meeting (or failing to meet) their commitments, as well as insight into why non-binding commitments are believed and acted on.
for the behavior reported in the team communication treatment. The paper ends with a brief summary of results reported and possible extensions of this line of research.
I. Experimental Design and Procedures
There are two treatments using the same experimental design as Charness and Dufwenberg (2006; hereafter CD) . The first treatment uses individuals, designed to calibrate and replicate behavior for our subject population. The second uses two person teams who must coordinate their actions. The game tree is shown in Figure 1 , with the names of players and strategies the same as those used in the experimental instructions.
2 Also shown, in parentheses, are dollar payoffs, with As' payoffs listed first followed by Bs'. It is a sequential move game programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
[Insert Fig 1 here]
A's move first, deciding between In or Out, with payoffs of $5 to both A and B for Out.
A's payoff for In depends on B's choice, with expected earnings greater than $5 if B cooperates (Rolls), and $0 if not. Participants played 5 periods of the same game with perfect stranger matching, and no feedback regarding outcomes until the last period. 3 Roles were held constant throughout a session, with one period chosen randomly to determine earnings (along with a $5
show-up fee). At the end of a session participants learned the payoff they would have received in each of the 5 periods, along with which the randomly selected period determining their payoff.
Subjects were told that they would not learn whether the chance move was a "Success" or a "Failure", so that As could not attribute a $0 payoff to B choosing Don't Roll.
Team treatments employed 2-person teams. 4 Teammates did not know each other's identity, sitting at separate computer terminals and communicating with each other through a continuously available chat box. Team composition remained the same for all 5 periods. Teams were required to reach agreement on all decisions, with the message protocol structured to allow input from both team members. Each team member received the payoff at the node of the game tree for the one, randomly selected, payoff period. There were no restrictions on the within-team discussions, except to refrain from using profanity and to not identify themselves in any way.
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Each treatment had several sessions with no communication and a similar number with communication -a between subject design with no overlap between subjects. In the no communication treatments, participants played the game exactly as shown in the game tree. All A's decided In or Out, followed by Bs deciding to Roll or Don't Roll, without seeing A's choice.
The Chance move was computerized, with the computer simulating the roll of a 6-sided die. In the communication treatment, Bs' had the opportunity to send a single free-form typed message to the A they were paired with, before A decided In or Out. After that, decisions proceeded as in the no communication treatment.
In the communication treatment, Bs had 2 minutes to reach agreement on their message.
Neither teams nor individuals were required to send a message and were explicitly told that they could leave the message blank or write "No Message". In order to give both teammates input into the message content either member could initially propose a message, with their teammate choosing to accept or reject it. If teammates agreed on the message it was sent after the 2 minutes expired. If they failed to agree, one member was randomly selected and given 30 seconds to write a message on behalf of the team (with the chat box turned off). 6 While the B teams decided on what message to send, A teams had 2 minutes to freely chat with each other.
After all B teams had written a message, they were delivered to their respective A team, with As having 1 minute to decide on In or Out. Teammates were required to agree on their decision, and if no agreement was reached, one teammate was randomly selected to make the decision on behalf of the team (with the chat box turned off Subjects were primarily from the undergraduate student population at the Ohio State University, recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . Sessions lasted under 1 hour, with payments averaging $11.50 per subject in the team sessions and $13 in the individual sessions, including a $5 show-up fee.
There were 4 individual subject sessions without communication with a total of 38 sets of A and B players, and 4 sessions with communication for a total of 42 pairs of A and B players.
The corresponding numbers for the team treatment were 7 sessions for a total of 37 pairs of A and B teams without communication, and 7 sessions with communication for a total of 40 pairs of A and B teams. 9 The statistical analysis is based on decisions at the individual-or team-level and, unless stated otherwise, taking averages of choices over the five periods.
II Experimental Results

Effects of Communication on Cooperation:
The left hand panel of Figure 2 reports the impact of communication on cooperation rates for individuals, with the corresponding statistical tests reported in the top row of The impact of communication on cooperation rates for teams is another matter (the second panel of Figure 2 , and the second row of Table 1 ). While communication significantly increased teams' In rates from 30% to 53% (p < 0.01), it had only a minor impact on Roll rates, an increase from 21% to 26% (p = 0.35).
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 here] Conclusion 1: Communication enhances cooperation rates on the part of first movers (A players) for both teams and individuals and, if anything, more so for teams compared to individuals. Communication increases cooperation rates on the part of second movers (B players) for individuals but has no effect on teams.
There is one subsidiary point to be made here regarding previously reported differences in trust between teams and individuals. In the standard (one-shot) trust game, comparing individuals with three person teams, Kugler et al. (2007) Table 2 below. The agreement rate between coders was 94%.
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[Insert Table 2 here]
Although subjects were free to send whatever message they wished, and the experimenters never mentioned promises, over 50% of the messages sent consisted of a Strong However, a better measure of differences in behavior conditional on the type of message received comes from the probits reported in Table 4 . 16 The impact of the different message categories is measured relative to the no communication treatment. The dependent variable is equal to 1 when first movers chose In (0, otherwise), with separate dummy variables (=1, 0 otherwise) for each of the four message categories. Standard errors are clustered at the subject or 13 Disagreements were confined to distinguishing between Strong and Weak Promises. 14 Differences between categories are evaluated using a Fisher exact test on the message frequencies corrected for multiple tests. 15 Frequencies are calculated conditional on the number of times In was chosen for each message category. For example, choosing In 2 out of 3 times after receiving a Strong Promise has an In rate of 66%.
16 Table 3 calculations are based on averages across agents, which can give higher weight to some agents. For example, an agent who receives 1 Strong Promise and chooses to go In has a 100% In rate in The pooled data show a significant negative effect for the team dummy, consistent with the higher levels of In for individuals reported for the raw data in Table 3 . There are no significant marginal effects from interacting the teams dummy with a pooled Promise dummy.
Conclusion 2:
There is a strong positive marginal effect on In following both Strong and Weak Promises for both teams and individuals (relative to the no communication treatment).These marginal effects are of about the same size for teams and individuals and are not significantly different between the two. These results are consistent with the literature on expectation based guilt aversion, in that both teams and individuals are substantially more willing to choose In following a Promise than following Empty Talk or No Message (i.e., act as if they expect B's to roll following a promise).
The period dummies are negative and significant at better than the 5% level for both teams and individuals which, at first blush, seems quite odd. However, the team chats reported on below suggest this is a false "end game" effect, most likely resulting from subjects' experience in previous experiments, e.g. "haha maybe we can do in for the first two or three rounds. people tend to be more nice the first several rounds." 17 The same regressions have been run on different subsets of the data to check if the results are driven by early-round confusion or late-round deterioration of cooperation. Similar results to those reported in Table 4 are observed restricting the analysis to periods 2-5 or 1-4. Promises is negligible, and not significant, for both individuals and teams. Once again the period variable is negative so that second movers are subject to this false "end game" effect as well.
Second Movers Actions in Relation to Messages Sent:
Conclusion 3:
The marginal effect of a Strong Promise on the likelihood of choosing Roll is positive and significant for individuals, but not for teams. Weak Promises along with the remaining message categories have small marginal effects on the likelihood of choosing Roll for both teams and individuals, none of which are statistically significant.
There is an important analogy between these results and results from simultaneous move, one-shot, prisoner dilemma games in the psychology literature. In that case too, communication increases joint cooperation by a substantial and significant amount for individuals, but not for teams (see Insko et al., 1993) . 19 The difference in cooperation rates between teams and individuals in this, and related experiments, is attributed to the fact that "… groups provide their members with support for acting in a self-benefiting manner, whereas individuals have no such support. Social support is important because it helps to overcome pressure from three norms, equity, equality and reciprocity." (Insko et al., 1993, p. 115 ).
The within-team chat analysis reported on below focuses on the extent to which team member support for self-benefiting choices underlies decisions not to Roll following Promises to do so. It also examines the extent to which teams, when choosing to Roll, are motivated out of guilt and/or a desire for consistency, the preferred explanations for the increase in cooperation rates with communication from earlier experiments (CD and Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004 
III Analysis of Team Chats
Within-team discussions were coded and analyzed to better understand teams' decision processes. Procedures were similar to those used for categorizing messages sent: Two undergraduate students read through and independently coded the team chats after first being instructed on the categories of interest. 20 The coding focuses on second movers' motivation for choosing Roll after having made a promise to cooperate, as well as the motivation for As choosing In.
Coding categories for As, along with the frequency with which they were coded and agreement rates between the two coders, are reported in Table 7 . Examples for each category are provided in the Appendix. All categories were coded at the period-level. Coders were instructed to base their coding strictly on within team discussions for the period in question. 21 The percentage of teams satisfying a category is calculated in terms of whether either coder coded the category in question. Agreement rates were calculated as the number of periods where both coders coded a category, divided by the total number of times at least one of them coded the category. Disagreements were rarely about opposite interpretations of what teams were discussing (e.g., one coding A2, the other coding A3), instead typically resulting one coder's failure to code a given category while the other one did.
22 20 Coding instructions can be found in the Appendix. 21 This was done for two reasons: First, while discussions are correlated across periods within a team, As' choice of
In is heavily dependent on type of message received, which changes from one period to the next. Second, historydependent coding would lead coders to make inferences based on discussions in a past periods, which would have resulted in even more subjective coding discussions. 22 Coders had opposite interpretations only 2% of the time for A2 versus A3 and 7% for A4 versus A5.
A Teams: Codes for As focused on their interpretation of messages received. In the analysis
Strong and Weak Promises are combined into a single "Promise" category, and Empty Talk and No Messages into a single "Empty Message" category for parsimony.
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[ Table 7 goes here] Figure 3 shows In rates conditional on whether teams discussed the message received in a given period or not. Teams often discussed the credibility of specific messages or made contingent plans to base their decisions on the message content. For example, 4: So, should we just go out every time unless they send us a message saying they swear or something? 20: yeah, lets just see based on context Discussions showed that teams not only believed the messages to be meaningful in general, but also believed that specific messages were more informative than others. For example, after receiving a Weak Promise, one subject remarked "if they would have typed 'we promise' afterwards, i'd give it to em." Though subjects recognize that messages need not be truthful, they believed that strongly worded statements of intent were more likely to be upheld. Figure 3 shows that when explicitly discussing the content of the message received, As are substantially more likely to chose In following a Promise (65%) than following an Empty Message (65% vs 22%, p < 0.01). In rates were also higher after a Promise, even when not discussing the message (52% vs 44%), but fail to achieve statistical significance (p = 0.14).
That Promises still have an effect bordering on statistical significance in these cases, likely reflects previous discussions regarding Promises. (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004) . We coded for "guilt" and "feeling bad"
(B1 in Table 8 ) conditional on sending a Strong Promise. In addition we coded for justification for choosing Don't Roll (B2; e.g. it makes the most money) and for choosing Roll (B3; e.g., it makes everyone better off). There were no discussions related to consistency between teams' messages and their actions.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Teams never discussed what As' expected other than when discussing ways to get the higher payoff. an implicit second-order expectation that a Promise will lead As to expect them to Roll. But for teams these second-order beliefs, if anything, occur more often when deciding not to Roll. This is not surprising given the small (4%) increase in Roll rates with communication, and accounts for the high Promise rates when choosing Don't Roll. Message. In deciding not to Roll, expressions of guilt and/or feeling bad are slightly higher following a Promise (24% vs 16%, p = 0.32). When deciding to Roll, expressions of guilt or feeling bad are slightly lower following a Promise compared to an Empty Promise (16% vs 25%, p =0.56). So for teams at least, expressions of guilt or feeling bad, which can be interpreted as expressing second order beliefs regarding the impact of Promises on As choices, were essentially the same whether making a Promise or sending an Empty Message. The fact that when deciding to Roll, expressions of guilt are, if anything, a little higher following an Empty Message versus a Promise indicates that decisions to Roll, for teams at least, are not rooted in expectation-based guilt aversion or a desire for consistency between ones' actions and the message sent.
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The fact that teams discuss feeling bad or guilty when choosing Don't Roll following a Promise serves to confirm the existence of moral costs associated with decisions not to Roll.
However, in deciding not to Roll, these moral costs are not high enough for teams to act unselfishly. For example:
2: i really hope we get groups who want to take risks haha 2: does that make me a bad person? 15: yeah but me too so whatever 2: im buying chipotle with whatever money i get 15: worth the guilt Note the "social support" for acting selfishly and own payoff maximization, as discussed in the psychology literature.
We identified all those teams who choose to send a Promise and Rolled in any period.
The literature for individuals suggests that a decision to Roll following a Promise is based on guilt aversion or a desire for consistency. With this in mind, we classified the reasons stated for choosing to Roll for each team: other-regarding preferences (41%), message-based (consistency) concerns (18%), confusion (29%), or no reason given (24%). 27 An example of other regarding preferences is given below: 2: we should definitely not roll 3: Hello! I agree 2: should we write them a message? 3: however, we should tell the other group that (we will Roll) since we have an 80% shot at getting the 12/10 thats what we want (parentheses added)
Teams that decided to Roll did much the same the same:
13: What are your thoughts? 16: I think we'd better choose to cooperate 13: What should our message say? These are not isolated instances. Only 3 out of 40 teams were identified as deciding on their message before deciding which action to take. This is consistent with the fact that decisions to Roll or Don't Roll are unrelated to whether a team sent a Promise or an Empty Message. It would be interesting to devise a way to determine if the timing of individual choices is the same.
Conclusion 4:
Teams promise to Roll at essentially the same rate, regardless of whether they actually Roll or not (84% when Rolling, 75% when not Rolling). Expressions of "guilt" or "feeling bad" occur at low rates, with essentially the same rate regardless of whether teams Roll or Don't Roll, and when sending a Promise to Roll or an Empty Message. When choosing Don't Roll, Promises are typically designed to induce As to choose In to achieve higher payoffs. When choosing to Roll, teams are primarily motivated by standard other-regarding preferences and confusion (70% total). To the extent that decisions to Roll are a result of other-regarding preferences, this would provide the foundation for elicited second order beliefs, or the desire for consistency, to be associated with cooperating in games of this sort.
IV Summary and Conclusions
This experiment explores the differences between two-person teams and individuals in a one-shot, hidden action trust game with and without communication. The primary message from this experiment is that the increase in cooperation raters observed in (one-shot) hidden action trust games for individuals does not extend to two person teams. This adds to the literature showing that teams, in their role as second movers, are much more self-serving and own maximizing than individuals (Kugler, Kausel, and Kocher, 2012; Charness and Sutter, 2012) . As for first movers, teams are as trusting of promises as individuals. The analysis of B teams' discussions supports the hypothesis from the psychology literature that this self-serving is rooted in the fact that "… groups provide their members with support for acting in a self-benefiting manner, whereas individuals have no such support. Social support is important because it helps to overcome pressure from three norms, equity, equality and reciprocity." (Insko et al., 1993, p. 115 ). It's been argued that the high degree of trust and cooperation exhibited in hidden action games suggests a more limited need for formal contracts than previously discussed in the economics literature (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) . While this may well be true for individuals, the present data shows it is not true for teams. To the extent that most important economic transactions occur between teams (e.g., corporations) this distinction is important.
On a more detailed level, our results do replicate those reported in the literature in that communication in the hidden action trust game serves to increase cooperation rates substantially.
Although expressions of guilt or feeling bad expressed on the part of teams when deciding not to Roll, occurring 24% of the time following a Promise, they do not rise to the level of promoting high levels of following through on those Promises. Finally, although the formal process calls for Bs' to send messages before choosing to Roll or not, the team chats show that these decisions are made first, after which the message sent is formulated. Just that teams tend to use the message to get As to choose In so that they can exploit their choices.
There is one final point worth making here. Although this experiment adds to the small and growing literature that teams are more selfish and closer to the predictions of standard economic theory than individuals, these results are largely limited to one-shot games. In repeated play games, teams may be a little more fearful to begin with, but with some experience, and a fresh start they may be as, if not more, cooperative than individuals (Kagel and McGee, 2016) .
The "shadow of the future" serves to promote cooperation between individuals as well as teams.
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29 Also see Insko et al. (2001) which shows that anticipation of future interactions within a prisoner's dilemma game significantly reduces the differences between teams and individuals reported in one-shot games. 
A3
Reasons they should not believe the message 19% (0.45) (e.g. the other them could just lie)
A4
Recognize that In is risky, but willing to take a chance to get 65% (0.29) higher reward.
A5
Recognize that In is risky, but not willing to take a chance 53% (0.33)
1 Frequencies and agreement rates for A1-A3 are conditional on receiving a Strong Promise 
B2
Give a justification for choosing "Don't Roll" 68% (0.47) (e.g. it will make them more money).
B3
Give a justification for choosing "Roll" 30% (0.14) (e.g. it is more fair to the other team).
Figure 1: Game Tree: As' move first. Bs' choose second not knowing As' choices. Chance is probability a decision to Roll will actually occur (success) or will result in Don't Roll (failure). With communication, Bs' have an opportunity to send a short, non-binding, messages to As' before they choose In or Out. 
